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Last year, I made a habit of checking the live feed of a particularly pitiful webcam.
The view showed a muddy gravel lot bisected by a chain-link fence in the coastal marshes of southern New Jersey. No person or vehicle ever entered the frame, though I half expected the site to be bustling with activity as the state transformed it into a billion-dollar port for offshore wind.
Only once when I checked this live feed did I see something different. On a summer evening, I logged on and the camera panned to another angle, which showed an adjacent site where some construction work on the New Jersey Wind Port had started and then stopped. A view of the vast Delaware Bay loomed in the background. I watched the sun set over the half-built, now-abandoned port.
Some metaphors write themselves.
The Garden State megaproject, championed by former Democratic Gov. Phil Murphy, is just one offshore wind project among many that were disrupted by the Trump administration last year. Throughout 2025, the federal government clawed back federal funds, sunsetted wind tax credits, and froze permitting for wind farms. It ended the year with a bang: About two weeks ago, the administration issued a sweeping stop-work order to all five offshore wind farms under construction in the U.S.
The fall of New Jersey’s offshore wind port mirrors the fate of planned wind farms, ports, and manufacturing sites that many states, particularly in the Northeast, had spent decades building up.
Still, multiple experts told Canary Media it was inaccurate to call the industry “dead.” At least one described the state of affairs as a hibernation — and as a key time for “learning” before the next wave of activity.
According to some analysts, it’s not easy to see when — or if — that next wave of offshore-wind activity will come.
When Donald Trump was elected last November, BloombergNEF expected the U.S. to build 39 gigawatts of offshore wind by 2035. BNEF’s latest forecast, released in October, expected just 6 gigawatts to be built by 2035 — an amount equivalent to the capacity of those five wind farms that were under construction and America’s only fully completed project, New York’s South Fork.
Even that may be optimistic if Trump’s late-December stop-work order results in cancellations.
In other words, according to BNEF, it’s possible that no new wind farms will break ground in the U.S. for the next decade. Even with a recent court ruling deeming Trump’s permitting freeze “unlawful,” developers would struggle to finance projects that aren’t already underway, analysts say. It’s also hard to imagine why an offshore wind developer would bother trying to get a new project off the ground while Trump is in office, given the level of turmoil and explicit ire.
“We think the risks are inherent to the Trump administration,” said Harrison Sholler, an offshore wind analyst for BNEF.
The sector also faces cost pressures both related and unrelated to Trump.
Even before 2025, pandemic-related supply chain issues, rising interest rates, and inflation had all made it more expensive to build offshore wind in America, Sholler said. In fact, those pre-Trump macroeconomic conditions caused a few projects to collapse during the Biden administration.
But the cost issue has gotten worse, not better, since Trump was sworn in last January.
Take New Jersey’s wind port, for example: The $637 million state-backed project broke ground in 2021 and was supposed to be a staging area for two wind farms planned for the Garden State’s coastline — Atlantic Shores and Ocean Wind. Days after Trump took office, Atlantic Shores began imploding when co-developer Shell pulled out and the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities declined to grant the projects a power purchase agreement. Both Shell and the utility board cited “uncertainty” over federal actions. And in late 2023, developer Ørsted pulled the plug on Ocean Wind and its port commitments because of rising costs. The port’s fate is uncertain, and its webcam appears frozen.
Overall, “offshore wind has gotten one-third more expensive based on our modeling, and that doesn’t include the effects of tariffs,” said Sholler, who explained that the cost increases in BNEF’s latest calculations were driven by Trump’s July move to phase out federal tax credits much earlier than the date previously set by the Biden administration.
Offshore wind, as a sector, has had bad timing in the United States.
The Biden administration started issuing full project approvals about a year into the Covid-19 pandemic, which had scrambled supply chains and sent interest rates soaring. Amid these economic hurdles, the U.S. charged forward with offshore wind anyway.
Elizabeth Klein, former director of the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, defended the pace at which the federal government permitted new offshore wind farm projects, even as financial conditions worsened.
“It was incredibly important to get as many projects permitted as possible so we can build some proofs of concept,” Klein said.
But that might have been a mistake, according to Elizabeth Wilson, a wind energy expert and professor of environmental studies at Dartmouth College, who said state and federal leaders should have slowed down wind development during that time instead of leaning in.
“We were building a whole new sector … Building it as rapidly as we had hoped to do was even more ambitious,” Wilson said.
America’s offshore wind industry, Wilson said brightly, is now in a “learning phase.” And considerable learning, she argues, has already happened: State governments are currently more equipped to grow and manage offshore wind power than they were five years ago.
Wilson and three colleagues published a study this month demonstrating that U.S. states, even prior to Trump 2.0, were already “drawing lessons” from the challenges they encountered while trying to launch the nation’s first offshore wind farms.
In New York, for example, state regulators adapted the way they price power purchase agreements to better account for rising costs. In New Jersey, an early oversight in transmission planning led to new requirements for offshore wind developers to show how they would better coordinate transmission across the regional power grid. And throughout the Northeast, state governors — working with federal regulators — identified better processes for compensating fishermen for lost revenue due to wind farm construction.
It’s unclear what learnings will arise from Trump 2.0, but Wilson offered a few preliminary suggestions.
First, regulatory stability is paramount, especially given the industry’s long and cumbersome permitting pipeline. Trump demonstrated how much damage can be caused by a shift in the political winds.
Though it’s impossible to guarantee political stability, Wilson suggested that state and federal regulators could, under a more hospitable future administration, revise the permitting system to at least make it faster and smoother.
After all, European energy developers, who are leaders in offshore wind, were surprised by the fragmented permitting and uncoordinated regulatory landscape they encountered in America, according to Wilson.
This kind of change might address the friction that occurs for projects trying to get approved by multiple governments, which has indeed eroded investor confidence in recent years, according to BNEF’s Sholler.
Klein agreed that coordination between states, counties, and federal agencies could improve, but she also pointed out that the current way of doing things did get results.
“Our permitting process is not broken … We got 11 projects approved,” she said, referencing her time leading the federal branch that regulates offshore wind farms during the Biden administration.
Wilson argues that another “site for learning” would be the Coastal Virginia Offshore Wind project, which, based on its history of strong bipartisan support, could be a “model of success.”
Klein agreed, calling CVOW, “a little bit of a unicorn.”
The project, located nearly 30 miles off the coast of Virginia Beach, Virginia, has the distinction of being America’s largest offshore wind farm and the only one that is getting built by a regulated utility. The project was slated to feed the grid starting this March — and, prior to last month’s federal pause, was progressing on schedule.
Dominion Energy, the utility building the project, operates under a “vertically integrated model,” said Wilson, giving it a long-term stability that is beneficial to slow-moving offshore wind development.
Virginia is also the world’s data-center capital, with tremendous energy demand that offshore wind is especially good at serving, especially in extreme winter conditions. Thanks to CVOW’s careful site placement and community engagement, opposition from fishermen and local groups has been relatively low, according to Captain Bob Crisher, a Virginia-based commercial fisherman.
Still, the project was ultimately not spared the major political obstacle of a Trump administration stop-work order.
Perhaps the biggest lesson, for Wilson at least, is that hyping the offshore wind industry did little good. The target dates and costs estimated were possibly “overhyped,” she said, leading lawmakers and others who turned a blind eye to the reality of offshore wind farms being, ultimately, megaprojects.
Offshore wind is a megaproject sector, and “megaproject dynamics” are well studied in Europe, said Wilson. These social and political processes are predictable, in that costs always go over, timelines typically run long, and environmental impacts are often not well communicated. Over the years, these inevitable outcomes gave influential offshore wind opponents and GOP lawmakers fodder for pushing back on offshore wind.
“This is a useful framework: Megaprojects are hard,” she said.
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